

# *Railroad Safety & Risk Analysis Using North American Accident Database Systems*

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克禮思·巴肯

**Professor**

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**29 November 2018**

**3<sup>rd</sup> Workshop on Railway Operation  
for Safety and Reliability**




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# Thank you for the invitation!

# 謝謝



北京交通大学  
BEIJING JIAOTONG UNIVERSITY



國立臺灣大學  
National Taiwan University

## The 3<sup>rd</sup> Workshop on Railway Operation for Safety and Reliability



香港城市大學  
City University of Hong Kong

29 November 2018, City University of Hong Kong



# Supporters of RailTEC Safety & Risk Research



U.S. Department of Transportation

- and various petroleum, chemical and refining companies


# Acknowledgements



- Research conducted by a number of talented and dedicated students, past and present



- Ph.D.

Samantha Chadwick  
Athaphon Kawprasert  
Chen-Yu Lin  
Xiang Liu  
M. Rapik Saat  
Brandon Wang






- M.S.

Jesus Aguilar  
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Kaiyu Wang  
Lijun Zhang



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Jaemin Kim  
Sam Pal  
Max Potvin  
Geordie Roscoe




# Outline of Presentation

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
- Introduction to North American rail safety trends
- Types of data needed for railroad safety and risk analysis
- Review several projects:
  - Optimizing Tank Car Safety Design
  - Multiple Tank Car Release Risk
  - Analysis of Train Derailment Rates, Causes, and Changes
  - Loaded versus Empty Unit Train Derailment Cause Analysis
  - Adjacent Track Accident Risk Model Development

# Substantial decline in major North American railroads' mainline derailment rate: 2006 - 2015



- 50% reduction in mainline derailment rate in this time period
- However, this improvement occurred at the same time as an even more dramatic increase in hazardous dangerous goods traffic

# Decline in railroad derailment rate coincided with increase in flammable liquid traffic



- Beginning in the mid-2000s flammable liquid traffic, notably ethanol and petroleum crude oil grew more than 10-fold
- Most of this traffic was moving in large unit trains rather than single carload shipments

# Safety paradox, derailments were declining but serious incidents were increasing



- Substantial increase in rail transport of ethanol and petroleum crude oil led to a corresponding increase in derailments involving these products



**New Brighton, PA**



**Cherry Valley, IL**



**Lac-Mégantic, QC**



**Casselton, ND**



**Aliceville, AL**



**Mt. Carbon, WV**


**... and a number of others**



# Decline in accidents part of a longer-term trend, but shows evidence of diminishing returns



- Eliminating the remaining accident causes is an increasingly stubborn problem
- Requires more sophisticated data and analytical techniques to prioritize investment in most effective risk reduction strategies



# Railroad freight train risk reduction strategies



## Infrastructure



**e.g. Track upgrade**  
*Reduce accident occurrence*

## Operational




**e.g. Speed reduction**  
*Reduce accident severity*

## Railcar/Container



**e.g. Tank car safety design**  
*Reduce incidence and severity of releases*

## Routing




**e.g. Alternative routings**  
*Reduce impact of releases*

# Railroad data systems needed for safety and risk analysis



- Accidents and incidents – what, when, where, why & how occurred
- Operations and traffic – type, routing and exposure
- Infrastructure – routes and characteristics
- Rolling stock – safety design characteristics



\*This is an artist's conceptual rendering and does not represent an actual engineering rendering of a "future" car

# Railroad accident and incident data

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- **US DOT Federal Railroad Administration**
  - Highway-rail grade crossing accident/incident (58 variables + narrative)
  - Rail equipment accident/incident (80 variables + narrative)
  - Death, injury, or occupational illness (>40 variables + narrative)
  
- **US DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration**
  - Hazardous materials incident report (90 variables + narrative)
  
- **RSI-AAR Railroad Tank Car Safety Research and Test Project**
  - Railroad tank car accident database
    - Train accident characteristics (37 variables and >30,000 records)
    - Damage and performance of tank cars involved in accidents (34 variables and >48,000 records)

# Railroad operations and traffic

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- **Association of American Railroads**
  - TRAIN II – Detailed records of railcars, lading transported, and routing of most rail shipments in North America
  - Analysis of Class 1 Railroads – Detailed annual summary of railroad operating statistics
  
- **US Surface Transportation Board**
  - Waybill Sample – Statistically robust sample of rail shipment movements over US rail network
  
- **Major North American railroads**
  - Operating data – Detailed data on train makeup, movements, routing, schedules, traffic composition and volume, railcars, and commodities transported (proprietary)

# Railroad infrastructure route characteristics

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- **Association of American Railroads**
  - Analysis of Class 1 Railroads – Annual summary of certain railroad infrastructure characteristics
- **US DOT Federal Railroad Administration**
  - Grade crossing inventory file – Data on all US grade crossings
- **Major North American railroads**
  - Detailed data on track characteristics, train control systems, and numerous other characteristics (proprietary)
- **Geographic Information System (GIS) databases**
  - US Bureau of Transportation Statistics: National Transportation Atlas Database – GIS database of US rail network
  - US Census Service: TIGER\* data – GIS database of US population distribution
  - Various other GIS databases on numerous features of interest including environmental characteristics, waterways, etc.

\* Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing

# Railroad rolling stock design characteristics

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


- **Association of American Railroads**
  - UMLER (Universal Machine Language Equipment Register)  
Detailed data on nearly all rail rolling stock operating in North America
- **RSI-AAR Railroad Tank Car Safety Research and Test Project**
  - Car design properties and lading transported for tank cars involved in accidents (40 variables)

# Examples of recent and current research



- Optimizing Tank Car Safety Design
- Multiple Tank Car Release Risk
- Analysis of Train Derailment Rates, Causes, and Changes
- Loaded versus Empty Unit Train Derailment Cause Analysis
- Adjacent Track Accident Risk Model Development





# Optimizing Tank Car Safety Design

M. Rapik Saat, Ph.D.

Graduate Research Assistant

now


Director - Operations Analysis

Policy & Economics Department

Association of American Railroads





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
*\*This is an artist's conceptual rendering*

# Fundamental tradeoff in tank car design: Safety versus efficiency



- Principal approaches to enhance tank car safety design:
  - Thicker/stronger head and/or head shield
  - Thicker/stronger shell
  - Adding top fittings protection
  - Removing bottom fittings
- Stronger tank and better-protected fittings **improve accident performance**
- Also increase weight and cost, thereby **reduce transportation efficiency**
- Thus there is a **tradeoff** between enhanced safety and transport efficiency

# Change in light weight and probability of release for each tank car safety design modification




Example: 263,000-lb maximum GRL for 30,000-gallon baseline 111 tank car

# Pareto optimal set of flammable liquid tank car design options



BASELINE  
Non-Jacketed  
7/16" Tank



# *Multiple Tank Car Release Risk*

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**Xiang Liu, Ph.D.**

**Graduate Research Assistant**

**now**

**Assistant Professor**

**Rutgers University**




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
# Previous tank car safety research focused on single car performance



- Optimization techniques and tank car data used to quantitatively identify combinations of design features that maximized tank car safety performance\*
- This approach alone was successful when focused on single-car release incidents such as environmentally sensitive chemicals (ESC) or toxic inhalation hazard materials (TIH)
- Substantial growth in unit-trains transporting petroleum and alcohol suggested need to consider probability of multiple-car release events†



# Safety performance of flammable liquid tank cars derailed in accidents




\* CPR(100) = Probability that a tank car derailed in an FRA-reportable accident releases  $\geq 100$  gallons due to the impacts it receives in the derailment

# Events leading to a release incident



## Accident Cause



## Influencing Factors

- track quality
- method of operation
- track type
- human factors
- equipment design
- railroad type
- traffic exposure


- speed
- accident cause
- train length

- number of HM cars in the train
- train length
- placement of HM cars in the train


- HM car safety design
- operating speed
- accident characteristics



# Analytical framework for estimating probability distribution of number of tank cars releasing



# Effect of tank car safety design on estimated interval\* between multiple-car release incidents



\* Assuming 2012 levels of crude oil and alcohol tank car traffic (ca. 550,000 carloads)  
*Ceteris paribus*, the estimated intervals will be reduced in proportion to increases in traffic

# *Analysis of Train Derailment Rates, Causes, and Changes*

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**Brandon Wang**


**Graduate Research Assistant**



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# Frequency vs Severity of Mainline Derailments




# Changes in Derailment Rate by Cause

## Group: 2006 – 2010 vs 2011 - 2015



- Broken rails or welds showed the most reduction, followed by track geometry
- Derailments due to extreme weather increased



# *Loaded versus Empty Unit Train Derailment Cause Analysis*

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**Geordie Roscoe**

**Undergraduate Research Assistant**



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# Summary statistics for loaded vs. empty unit train derailments



| Loading Condition | Number of Accidents | Tons (1,000s) | Train Length <sup>†</sup> | Average Speed <sup>†</sup> | Average Number of Cars Derailed* | Average POD* |
|-------------------|---------------------|---------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------|
| Loaded            | 1,536               | 14.2          | 106.9                     | 25.1                       | 11.5                             | 54.4         |
| Empty             | 303                 | 3.0           | 106.8                     | 24.8                       | 8.9                              | 41.8         |
| Other             | 4,180               | 7.1           | 77.9                      | 22.5                       | 8.3                              | 34.2         |

\* Denotes that significant difference for loaded and empty train derailments

† Denotes no significant difference between loaded and empty train derailments

- Loaded unit trains were five times more frequent than empty unit trains
- Loaded unit trains weighed over four times more than empty trains
- Similar train length and speed for both loading conditions
- Loaded trains tended to derail more cars
- Position of first derailed (POD) car was farther back in loaded trains than empty



# Substantial difference in most frequent causes for **loaded** & **empty** unit train derailments



| Rank | Loaded Train Causes               | Number | Empty Train Causes                | Number |
|------|-----------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------|--------|
| 1    | Broken Rails or Welds             | 288    | Severe Weather                    | 33     |
| 2    | Broken Wheels (Car)               | 175    | Broken Rails or Welds             | 31     |
| 3    | Other Axle/Journal Defects (Car)  | 127    | Track Geometry (excl. Wide Gauge) | 25     |
| 4    | Bearing Failure (Car)             | 122    | Other Wheel Defects (Car)         | 24     |
| 5    | Buckled Track                     | 93     | Buckled Track                     | 15     |
| 6    | Track Geometry (excl. Wide Gauge) | 80     | Lading Problems                   | 13     |
| 7    | Wide Gauge                        | 74     | Other Brake Defect (Car)          | 10     |
| 8    | Roadbed Defects                   | 44     | All Other Car Defects             | 10     |
| 9    | Turnout Defects - Switches        | 41     | Train Handling (excl. Brakes)     | 9      |
| 10   | Other Rail and Joint Defects      | 36     | Non-Traffic, Weather Causes       | 8      |

Causes in **red** are **unique** to loaded unit trains, causes in **blue** are **unique** to empty unit trains and causes in **black** are **shared** by the two loading conditions



# *Adjacent Track Accident Risk Model Development*

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**Chen-Yu Lin**

**Graduate Research Assistant**



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


# Adjacent track accidents (ATA)




- ATAs refer to train accident scenarios where derailed railroad equipment intrudes upon adjacent tracks, causing operational disruptions and potential subsequent collisions on the adjacent track(s)
- Other ATA scenarios include collisions between trains on adjacent tracks (raking collisions), turnouts, and railroad crossings (side collisions)
- A typical adjacent track accident scenario:

Normal Operation




Equipment loading gauge


Derailment



Intrusion




Collision



# Integrated ATA risk assessment model




- Combine probability models for initial accident, intrusion and train presence on adjacent tracks to develop a holistic risk assessment model for ATA
- Account for **common affecting factors** in different probability models



# ATA model application: hypothetical shared rail corridor




$$R = P(D) \times P(I|D) \times P(T|I|D) \times C$$




# Calculate segment-specific ATA risk



$$R_i = P(D)_i \times P(I|D)_i \times P(T|I|D)_i \times C_i$$



# Identify high ATA risk segments



# Conclusion: Efficient investment in train safety is essential

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- Continued decline in derailment rates benefits the rail industry and the public
- Continued pressure, both internally and externally, for further improvement
- Most effective means of improving train safety becomes less obvious (and often more costly) as incident rate declines
- Industry (and government) must stay focused on identifying the most effective means for improvement
- Increasingly sophisticated data and analytical methods can be used to understand the most efficient ways to invest in safety improvements

Thank you very much! Questions?





# APPENDICES

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


- **Derailment analysis**
  - Factors affecting downward trend and rate
  - Effect of train length on derailment occurrence
  - Quantitative assessment of impact of speed restrictions
  - Early detection of changes in derailment rate
  - Loaded vs empty train unit-train derailment occurrence and causes
- **Hazardous materials transportation safety and risk**
  - Unit vs manifest train risk of hazardous materials transport
  - Risk assessment tools for multiple railroad tank car releases
  - Risk analysis of toxic inhalation hazard tank car implementation
- **Grade crossing risk to railroads**
  - Derailment probability due to grade crossing incidents
  - Consequences of grade crossing incidents
- **Passenger train derailments**
  - Causal analysis and comparison to freight trains
  - Quantitative risk analysis of adjacent-track train accident risk

# Three-factor model of mainline freight train derailment rate: track class, method of operation & traffic density



■ <20 MGT and Non-Signaled    ■ <20 MGT and Signaled  
■ ≥20 MGT and Non-Signaled    ■ ≥20 MGT and Signaled



# How did the distribution of derailments change between 2006-2010 and 2011-2015?



## Number of Derailments: 2006 - 2010


| Traffic Density (MGT) | Method of Operation (MO) | FRA Track Class |     |     |     |     | Total |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
|                       |                          | 1               | 2   | 3   | 4   | 5   |       |
| <20                   | Non-Signaled             | 49              | 91  | 73  | 55  | 3   | 271   |
|                       | Signaled                 | 17              | 31  | 49  | 52  | 8   | 157   |
| ≥20                   | Non-Signaled             | 8               | 22  | 30  | 77  | 5   | 142   |
|                       | Signaled                 | 31              | 94  | 130 | 387 | 141 | 783   |
|                       |                          | 105             | 238 | 282 | 571 | 157 | 1,353 |

## Number of Derailments: 2011 - 2015


| Traffic Density (MGT) | Method of Operation (MO) | FRA Track Class |     |     |     |     | Total |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
|                       |                          | 1               | 2   | 3   | 4   | 5   |       |
| <20                   | Non-Signaled             | 28              | 48  | 43  | 43  | 0   | 162   |
|                       | Signaled                 | 17              | 31  | 44  | 62  | 10  | 164   |
| ≥20                   | Non-Signaled             | 7               | 10  | 8   | 27  | 0   | 52    |
|                       | Signaled                 | 25              | 61  | 97  | 312 | 102 | 597   |
|                       |                          | 77              | 150 | 192 | 444 | 112 | 975   |

\*Gross Ton-Miles: 2006 to 2010 = 16.7 trillion, 2011 to 2015 = 17.2 trillion


# Change in Estimated Derailment Rate by FRA Track Class



# Change in Estimated Derailment Rate by Method of Operation




# Change in Estimated Derailment Rate by Traffic Density



# Did Derailment Causes Show Uniform Rates of Change?




- Was the decline in accident causes proportional to their frequency or did some decline at a rate greater (or less) than average?
- Statistical analysis of the change in cause-specific derailment frequency





# Estimated Probability Distribution and Actual Number of Cars Releasing



# Cumulative Frequency Distribution of Loaded, Empty and Other Type Train Derailments

